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___________ 
  
O P I N I O N* 
___________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Ana Leticia Padilla-Maldonado (“Padilla-Maldonado”), a Salvadoran victim of 
domestic abuse, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) denying her application, on behalf of herself and her minor son, E.J.P., for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”). The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), who found that Padilla-
Maldonado had failed: (1) to corroborate her testimony with statements from her current 
partner and aunt or sufficiently explain her failure to do so, and thus did not meet her 
burden of proof of eligibility for asylum and withholding, and (2) to demonstrate, for 
purposes of her CAT claim, a likelihood of torture by, or with the acquiescence of, the 
Salvadoran government. Because it appears that the IJ did not provide Padilla-Maldonado 
with notice of the corroboration the IJ would require from Padilla-Maldonado’s partner 
and aunt, we will grant the petition in part and remand as to the asylum and withholding 
claims.  With respect to the CAT claim, however, because substantial evidence supports 
the BIA’s ruling, we will deny the petition.  On remand, the IJ should also consider 
whether, in light of the Attorney General’s overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G-, Padilla-
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court, and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Maldonado has established membership in a particular social group in order to be eligible 
for asylum. 
I. Factual Background 
Padilla-Maldonado and her son are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They 
entered the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, in October of 2015, after escaping alleged 
domestic abuse at the hands of her former partner, Santos Pablo Almendarez (“Pablo”). 
Padilla-Maldonado and Pablo began dating in 2012, when Pablo lived with Padilla-
Maldonado’s aunt, Petrona. They eventually moved in together and lived with E.J.P. 
(who is not Pablo’s son), Petrona, Petrona’s husband, and several cousins. 
In June or July of 2015, Padilla-Maldonado expressed to Pablo that she wished to 
end their relationship. Around the same time, she began a long-distance relationship with 
Ismael Turcios, a former acquaintance who lived in the United States, and with whom 
Padilla-Maldonado currently lives and has a U.S. citizen son. Padilla-Maldonado testified 
before the IJ that once Pablo learned that Padilla-Maldonado was communicating with 
Turcios in August of 2015, he became physically abusive toward her. 
The first assault occurred when Pablo woke Padilla-Maldonado up in the middle 
of the night, grabbed her by the neck, and threatened to “kill her and make her child 
disappear.” A.25–26; A. 52.1 The second assault happened while Padilla-Maldonado was 
speaking with Turcios. Pablo again grabbed Padilla-Maldonado by the neck, when E.J.P. 
                                              
1 It is unclear whether E.J.P. and Padilla-Maldonado’s cousins, who were sleeping in the 
same room, were awoken by this assault.  
4 
 
approached, asking for food, and Pablo threatened E.J.P., as well. Pablo also seized 
Padilla-Maldonado’s phone, which inadvertently recorded the encounter with E.J.P. and 
sent it to Turcios. 
A third physical assault occurred when Pablo grabbed Padilla-Maldonado by her 
hands and bruised her, before Petrona arrived and stopped him. Thereafter, Padilla-
Maldonado went to a private clinic to have her injuries examined and to consult the 
doctor about not sleeping due to the abuse. The doctor prescribed medication, 
administered an injection, recommended an x-ray, and noted Padilla-Maldonado’s bruises 
on her left hand from her “life partner,” who “suppressed [Padilla-Maldonado’s] 
departure to consult with [the] doctor.” A. 98. The doctor also wrote, “Patient with a state 
of panic, anxiety and depression who at the time with nervous breakdown is given 
treatment.” Id. 
In addition, Padilla-Maldonado testified that during August and September of 
2015, Pablo raped her approximately two times a week. Each time, Pablo would rape her, 
throw her down, hit her, and threaten to kill her and make her children disappear. Padilla-
Maldonado attested that although others slept in the same room as she, none were 
awakened by these incidents, because Pablo threatened her not to scream, and because 
sometimes she was raped outside, on her way to her grandparents’ house, or in a wooded 
area. 
Padilla-Maldonado testified that she did not report this abuse to the police because 
Pablo told her she would not be believed if she did. She claimed that she feared Pablo had 
gang affiliations, but was not certain—her fears were based on his having made gang 
5 
 
symbols or signs, and on rumors that Pablo was spending time with gang members. 
Similarly, Padilla-Maldonado claims she did not go to the hospital for fear of having to 
answer questions about her injuries. 
Finally, Petrona encouraged Padilla-Maldonado to seek refuge in the United 
States. On September 26, 2015, Padilla-Maldonado and E.J.P. left El Salvador for the 
United States. Padilla-Maldonado and Pablo have not been in contact since that date.  
II. Procedural History 
Padilla-Maldonado applied for asylum, withholding, and protection under the 
CAT on behalf of herself and E.J.P., who is a minor. At Padilla-Maldonado’s asylum 
hearing before the Immigration Court, the IJ found that Padilla-Maldonado had failed to 
corroborate her testimony and allegations of abuse with readily available evidence and 
noted inconsistencies in her testimony. Thus, the IJ denied Padilla-Maldonado’s claim to 
asylum or withholding because of her failure to meet her burden of proof to demonstrate 
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution due to her membership in a 
particular social group. The IJ also denied her CAT claim for a failure to demonstrate that 
it is more likely than not that Padilla-Maldonado would be tortured upon return to El 
Salvador, either by the government or at its acquiescence. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
determination that, due to her failure to adequately explain her lack of corroboration, 
Padilla-Maldonado did not meet her burden of proving her eligibility for asylum or 
withholding. Finally, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Padilla-Maldonado had 
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not demonstrated her eligibility for protection under the CAT, for the same reasons as 
articulated by the IJ. 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). Where the BIA issues an independent decision that relies on an IJ’s legal 
conclusions and findings of fact, we review both the IJ’s decision and the BIA’s. 
Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009). We uphold the BIA’s decision if 
the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 
478, 481 (1992); Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009). “Under that 
deferential standard, we must uphold the agency’s determination unless the evidence 
would compel any reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.” Gonzalez-Posadas v. 
Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015).  
IV. Asylum and Withholding of Removal  
To qualify for asylum, it is the applicant’s burden to prove that she is “unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. To be eligible for 
withholding of removal, an applicant must show “a clear probability of persecution.”  INS 
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v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). 
The IJ found cognizable Padilla-Maldonado’s particular social group, “Salvadoran 
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” which paralleled the proposed 
social group in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” A. 30.2 The IJ determined that 
Padilla-Maldonado did not meet her burden of proof to corroborate her otherwise credible 
testimony.  
“Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that 
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). This is particularly true when the testimony that requires 
corroboration is “central to an applicant’s claim.” Sandie, 562 F.3d at 252. We held in 
Chukwu v. Attorney General, “the IJ must give the applicant notice of what corroboration 
will be expected and an opportunity to present an explanation if the applicant cannot 
produce such corroboration.” 484 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). Additionally, before an IJ 
or the BIA may conclude that the applicant failed to meet her burden of proof due to a 
lack of corroboration, there is a three-part inquiry: the adjudicator must 1) identify facts 
where corroboration is reasonably expected; 2) determine whether the applicant has 
corroborated these facts; and 3) if not, determine whether there is an adequate 
                                              
2 The Government submitted a letter pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) informing the 
Court that the Attorney General has overruled the Board’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-
G- finding this particular social group to be cognizable. Matter of A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. 
316, 317 (A.G. 2018). We will discuss this infra section V. 
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explanation for the inability to corroborate. See Sandie, 562 F.3d at 253; Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Specifically, the IJ identified three parts of Padilla-Maldonado’s testimony where 
she failed to corroborate her claims or explain her failure to do so, when such 
corroboration “should reasonably be expected.” A. 29. First, the IJ found it curious that 
Turcios—who lives with Padilla-Maldonado, was threatened by Pablo, and received the 
recording of an incident in which Pablo was abusive to Padilla-Maldonado—failed to 
testify or provide a written statement. When probed as to the reason for Turcios’s 
absence, Padilla-Maldonado stated that he was working and did not receive permission to 
come and testify, because after he accompanied Padilla-Maldonado to prior appointments 
with her doctor or lawyer, he was instructed not to miss work further. 
Second, the IJ noted that Padilla-Maldonado and Turcios were unable to save or 
submit copies of the threatening text messages Pablo sent Turcios, or the recording 
wherein Pablo threatened E.J.P. When questioned by the Government, Padilla-
Maldonado stated that Turcios was no longer using that phone and thus she was unsure 
whether the call data was retrievable.  Padilla-Maldonado also testified that the phone 
data had been wiped. 
Third, the IJ questioned why Petrona, who lived with Padilla-Maldonado during 
the abuse and who knew Pablo for many years, did not submit an affidavit or testify 
before the IJ regarding the abuse. At first, Padilla-Maldonado explained that Petrona had 
been kidnapped by the Zeta cartel in Mexico, but then revealed that Petrona had been 
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released after her family paid ransom, and was living close to Padilla-Maldonado at the 
time. 
Padilla-Maldonado did submit her medical record from her August 24, 2015 visit 
with a doctor, who noted Padilla-Maldonado’s bruises from her “life partner,” and 
observed that Padilla-Maldonado was in a “state of panic, anxiety and depression” and 
appeared to be having a “nervous breakdown.” A. 98. Padilla-Maldonado also submitted 
an affidavit from her cousin Wendy Morales, whose statement the IJ found “generally 
coincide[d] with [Padilla-Maldonado’s] statements,” A. 29; as well as several reports 
describing violence against women in El Salvador. 
The IJ also noted some minor inconsistencies in Padilla-Maldonado’s testimony, 
including allegations of Pablo’s gang involvement,3 and the fact that Padilla-Maldonado 
did not mention that after her August 24, 2015 visit to the medical clinic, she was 
instructed to obtain an x-ray on her hand.  The IJ expected Padilla-Maldonado to provide 
further corroboration to explain these inconsistencies. 
Ultimately, the IJ found that Turcios and Petrona were key witnesses who the IJ 
reasonably expected to corroborate Padilla-Maldonado’s claims, and found Padilla-
Maldonado’s explanation for her failure to corroborate to be insufficient, as either 
witness could have submitted an affidavit in lieu of testifying. This, along with Padilla-
Maldonado’s failure to explain the inconsistencies in her statements, rendered her unable 
to meet her burden to prove her eligibility for asylum or withholding. 
                                              
3 The IJ stated that Padilla-Maldonado’s testimony, that she believed Pablo was a 
member of a gang based on what others told her, was inconsistent with her written 
statement that she knew of Pablo’s gang membership from his gang symbols and tattoos. 
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The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in its entirety, and wrote that it agreed that 
Padilla-Maldonado did not “adequately explain the absence of reasonably available 
evidence concerning material elements of her claim.” A. 7. 
We agree that it was reasonable for the IJ to expect Padilla-Maldonado to 
corroborate her claims with testimony or affidavits from Petrona and Turcios, when it 
appears realistic based on their proximity to Padilla-Maldonado in the United States, and 
because they were contemporaneously aware of Pablo’s abuse. We also note that the IJ 
provided Padilla-Maldonado with an opportunity to explain her failure to produce these 
witness statements and performed the three-step corroboration analysis required by 
Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554. However, it is not apparent from the record that the IJ gave 
Padilla-Maldonado adequate notice of what corroboration would be expected of her and 
that she would fail to meet her burden absent this corroboration.  
Our precedent counsels against faulting Padilla-Maldonado for not anticipating the 
IJ’s requirement for corroboration, absent notice. For example, in Toure v. Attorney 
General, the IJ “identified the corroborative evidence that she expected and why she 
expected it.” 443 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2006). However, “[i]t was not until the oral 
decision that the IJ indicated that she expected such evidence.” Id. Nor did the IJ give the 
petitioner “the opportunity . . . to seek supporting evidence from his relatives in Cote 
d’Ivoire. . .  .  Accordingly, [the petitioner] was not provided with notice and an 
opportunity to present an explanation.”4 Id. Moreover, our recent opinion in Saravia v. 
                                              
4 Although Padilla-Maldonado was given the opportunity to explain why she did not have 
corroborating evidence from Petrona and Turcios, in Toure, the petitioner was neither 
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Attorney General, 2018 WL 4688710 (3d Cir. 2018), makes clear that Chukwu is 
controlling regarding these aspects of corroboration.   
Similarly, we find that in light of Padilla-Maldonado’s testimony which she 
supplemented with other corroborating evidence, such as her medical report indicating 
abuse-related injuries, and the IJ’s failure to notify Padilla-Maldonado that testimony or 
affidavits from Petrona and Turcios would be critical to meeting her evidentiary burden, 
Padilla-Maldonado was not given adequate notice and an opportunity to produce this 
evidence. If Padilla-Maldonado had been told that a written statement or affidavit would 
suffice, given the opportunity, she might have been able to procure them from Petrona 
and Turcios. If given this opportunity on remand, and after such notice, she fails to 
produce this evidence or provide a reasonable explanation for why, a denial of her claims 
for failure to corroborate may be appropriate.  
Thus, we will vacate and remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ for further 
proceedings in connection with Padilla-Maldonado’s application for asylum and 
withholding of removal, consistent with this opinion. However, given Padilla-
Maldonado’s failure to demonstrate that she was likely to be subjected to torture from, or 
at the acquiescence of, the Salvadoran government, we find that the IJ appropriately 
denied her CAT relief, and that the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s findings is 
supported by substantial evidence.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
given advance notice nor provided the opportunity at the hearing to explain. Both aspects 
are important under our precedent. Toure, 443 F.3d at 324. 
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V. Particular Social Group Analysis 
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA had determined that the particular social group of 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” was cognizable 
for an asylum claim. I & N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). The Government has brought to our 
attention Matter of A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018), in which the Attorney 
General overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-and determined that the BIA erred in its analysis 
that determined the particular social group to be cognizable. The Attorney General 
concluded that this definition was too expansive. Matter of A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. at 319.  
The IJ in this case found that Padilla-Maldonado’s particular social group, 
“Salvadoran women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” paralleled the 
proposed social group in A-R-C-G-, thus finding it to be cognizable. While the overruling 
of A-R-C-G- weakens Padilla-Maldonado’s case, it does not automatically defeat her 
claim that she is a member of a cognizable particular social group. As we remand to the 
BIA to remand to the IJ, the IJ should determine whether Padilla-Maldonado’s 
membership in the group of “Salvadoran women in domestic relationships who are 
unable to leave” is cognizable according to the parameters of A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. at 
320.5 
                                              
5 We will not here attempt to describe all of the Attorney General’s directives in A-B-, but 
note that the memorandum indicates that Padilla-Maldonado must demonstrate:  
(1) membership in a particular group, which is composed of members who 
share a common immutable characteristic, is defined with particularity, and 
is socially distinct within the society in question; (2) that her membership in 
that group is a central reason for her persecution; and (3) that the alleged 
harm is inflicted by the government of her home country or by persons that 
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VI.  Conclusion 
We will deny the petition in part as to Padilla-Maldonado’s CAT claim, grant the 
petition in part and remand to the BIA for it to remand to the IJ as to her asylum and 
withholding claims. 
                                                                                                                                                  
the government is unwilling or unable to control. Furthermore, when the 
applicant is the victim of private criminal activity, the analysis must also 
consider whether government protection is available, internal relocation is 
possible, and persecution exists countrywide. 
27 I & N Dec. at 320 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
